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Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence*
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Résumé / Abstract
Ce texte étudie des processus de construction budgétaire, tant d'un point de
vue théorique que d'un point de vue de leur application expérimentale. Nous
spécifions une condition suffisante afin que l’équilibre électoral soit le même pour
les processus de construction budgétaire qu'ils soient de type « top-down » (par le
haut) ou de type « bottom-up » (par le bas). D'autre part, et bien que cela soit
souvent supposé, il n'est pas toujours vrai qu'à l’équilibre électoral un processus
de construction budgétaire « top-down » conduise à un plus faible budget global
que ne le ferait un processus budgétaire de type « bottom-up ». Pour tester les
conséquences de la théorie de l’équilibre électoral sur les processus de
construction budgétaire, une série de 128 expériences a été conduite en
laboratoire. Les résultats de ces expériences sont largement conformes à la théorie
de l’équilibre électoral, aussi bien au niveau des donnés agrégés qu'au niveau des
résultats individuels. Plus particulièrement, l'étude des résultats révèle que les
joueurs font preuve d'une véritable rationalité de décision tant pour formuler leur
proposition que pour établir leur stratégie de vote. Enfin, une information plus
complète et moins de catégories de dépenses conduisent à un plus grand succès de
prévision de la théorie de l’équilibre électoral et réduisent le temps nécessaire
pour atteindre une ratification budgétaire.
This paper studies budget processes, both theoretically and
experimentally. We give a sufficient condition for top-down and bottom-up budget
processes to have the same voting equilibrium. Furthermore, at a voting
equilibrium, it is not always true, as often presumed, that a top-down budget
process leads to a smaller overall budget than does a bottom-up budget process.
To test the implications for budget processes of voting equilibrium theory, we
conduct a series of 128 voting experiments using subjects in a behavior
laboratory. The experimental evidence from these experiments is well organized
by voting equilibrium theory, both at the aggregate level and at the individual
subject level. In particular, subjects display considerable evidence of rationality
in their proposals and votes. More complete information and fewer spending
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categories lead to greater predictive success of voting equilibrium theory, and
reduce the time needed to reach a budget decision.
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11. Introduction
A budget process is a system of rules governing the decision making that leads to a
budget, from its formulation, through its legislative approval, to its execution. Consider the
budget process of the United States government. The President formulates a budget proposal as
part of his annual obligation to report on the State of the Union. Each house of Congress then
reworks the budget proposal, with a final budget being passed by both houses for presidential
approval.
In the last quarter century, the details of the budget process, both in the United States and
in other countries, have been the object of considerable research (Wildavsky, 1975; Ferejohn and
Krehbiel, 1987; Alesina and Perotti, 1995, 1999; von Hagen and Harden, 1995, 1996; see also the
contributions in Poterba and von Hagen, 1999). There is a growing body of empirical research,
based on international comparative studies, suggesting that the design of budget processes has
considerable influence on the fiscal performance of governments. This has also been reflected in
political decisions. In the United States, the Budget Act of 1974, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act of 1985, and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1991 all tried to reduce excessive government
spending and deficits by changes in the budget process. In the European Union, the Maastricht
Treaty on European Union of 1992 mandates reform of budget processes of the member states to
enhance fiscal discipline.
One aspect of the budget process that has received considerable attention is the sequence
of budgeting decisions. Traditionally, Congress votes on budget items line-by-line, or category-
by-category. The sum of all spending approved by Congress emerged as the overall budget—a
budget process called bottom-up. The budget reforms stemming from the Budget Act of 1974
replaced this tradition with a different sequence. First, Congress was to vote on the total size of
the budget. Once that was determined, Congress would allocate that total budget among spending
categories. A budget process of that type is called a top-down process. It was argued at the time,
that a top-down budget process would lead to a better outcome, in particular, to a smaller budget,
than would a bottom-up budget process (Committee on the Budget, 1987).
A similar presumption is shared by many international organizations, which act as if a
top-down budget process is inherently preferable to a bottom-up process. The Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1987) reported approvingly that several
countries adopted top-down budget processes in quest of greater fiscal discipline. Schick (1986)
analyzes this report, explaining (and supporting) the thinking behind it in great detail. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) expresses a similar preference for top-down processes (IMF,
1996).
The presumption in favor of top-down budgeting stands in stark contrast to voting
equilibrium theory. Suppose rational agents participate as voters in a budget process. In
particular, if voters are sophisticated in the sense of Farquharson (1969) and Kramer (1972): they
consider the implications of voting in early stages of the budget process for later stages of the
process. Furthermore, assume that voters have convex preferences over the individual dimensions
of the budget, and that the budget process divides the decision-making process into a sequence of
2one-dimensional decisions. Based on these assumptions, Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987) show that
the voting equilibrium of a top-down budget process generally differs from the equilibrium of a
bottom-up process: sequence matters. However, there is no unambiguous relation between
sequence and the size of the budget. Depending on the voters’ preferences, a top-down process
can lead to larger or smaller budgets.
This argument, based on voting equilibrium, depends crucially on the rationality of
voters—itself an empirical issue. One way to get at this empirical issue is with controlled
laboratory experiments. While laboratory experiments create artificial environments, they have
the advantage over international comparisons that the design of an institution and the setting of a
decision-making process can be controlled much more precisely. Previous experiments have
found some evidence for sophisticated voting in two stage voting games (Holt and Eckel, 1989;
Davis and Holt,1993). Similarly, in a pilot experiment Gardner and von Hagen (1997) find that
structurally induced voting equilibrium best accounts for the data from their experimental trials of
bottom-up and top-down budget processes.
This paper reports on a series of 128 independent trials of voting over budgets. The first
testable implication of the theory of structurally induced voting equilibrium is that the outcome of
a budget process depends on the voters’ preferences and on structure of the process. Therefore,
we vary voters’ preferences and the structure of the process (bottom-up or top-down) in a
systematic way over these 128 trials. The second testable implication of the theory concerns the
effect dimensionalitythe number of spending categorieshas on the budget process and its
outcome. Whereas previous experiments have been confined to two dimensions, ours include
treatments with two and four dimensions. This leads to a gain in applicability, since naturally
occurring budget processes only rarely deal with two dimensions. A third testable implication of
the theory concerns the effect of incomplete information on the budget process and its outcome.
Whereas previous experiments have assumed complete information (each voter knows the
preferences of all voters), ours include treatments with complete and incomplete information. In
the incomplete information treatment, a voter knows only his or her own preferences, and not the
preferences of any other voter. This extension is again made in the interest of realism. Many
budgets are processed in situations where a voter has limited knowledge of the preferences of
other voters.
Our main result is that institutions matter. The data from all treatments correspond closely
to the theory of voting equilibrium, and institutions drive those equilibria. The subjects display a
high degree of sophistication over all treatments. Both extra dimensionality and incomplete
information increase the complexity of the decision problem subjects face, and increase the
number of periods needed to reach a final decision.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section sets out the general model, as well as
the specification we have implemented experimentally. Section 3 describes the experimental
design, as carried out at the economics behavior laboratory of the University of Karlsruhe. Our
aggregate results are presented in section 4; individual results, in section 5. Section 6 concludes
with the policy implications of these experiments.
32. A model of budgeting
We present a model of budgeting which is an extension to many dimensions of the model
of Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987). To solve this model, we use the notion of structurally induced
equilibria following McKelvy (1979).
2.1 The general model
There are n voters, indexed by i, i=1,..., n. Using majority rule, the voters decide on the
size and allocation of a budget. There are m spending categories in the overall budget. Let Rm+
denote the non-negative orthant of m-dimensional Euclidean space, the space of all possible
budget vectors. Let the vector x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ Rm+ denote a possible budget, where xj represents
spending in the budget category j. The total spending implied by the budget vector x is
B =  x j
j=1
m∑ .
Each voter i has preferences over budgets x represented by his or her utility function ui(x).
We assume that each voter i has an ideal budget (or an ideal point) x*(i). The closer the actual
budget is to a player’s ideal budget the higher is the player’s utility, where closeness is measured
by the Euclidean distance function. This implies
ui ( ) [ ( )]*x = − −
=
∑K x x ii j j
j
m
2
1
,
where Ki is the utility attached to the ideal point.1 In general, each voter i has an ideal point x*(i)
distinct from that of all other voters.
Several interpretations of players and their ideal points are possible. For instance, the
players may be spending ministers in a coalition government. In this case, an ideal point
represents the overall spending budget a spending minister would like to see enacted. Again,
suppose the player is a member of a legislature. Then the ideal point may represent a commitment
made by that legislator during his or her successful election campaign, to see that the ideal point
(or something as close to it as possible ) is enacted into legislation.
Assume that decisions are made by majority rule, applied in a pairwise fashion over two
budget proposals x and y. If  the number of those voting for x is greater than the number of those
voting for y, x defeats y. A budget x is a voting equilibrium, or a Condorcet equilibrium, if it
defeats all other budgets. Note that for n ≥ 3 and m ≥ 2, the paradox of voting—non-existence of
a Condorcet equilibrium—can occur ( Riker 1962).
                                                
1
 In the two dimensional case the Euclidean utility function leads to circular indifference curves. More
general preferences are studied experimentally in Lao-Araya (1998), whose results suggest that voting equilibrium
theory is robust with regard to elleptical indifference curves.
4To address the problem posed by the nonexistence of voting equilibrium in many
dimensions, various institutions have evolved, which use majority rule for a single dimension at a
time. With Euclidean preferences, there exists a voting equilibrium in each dimension, identified
with the median voter in that dimension. With m budget categories, at most m such decisions are
required, one for each spending category. The structure of a budget process induces a voting
equilibrium. The voting equilibrium so induced depends on the process. With an odd number of
voters, each with a unique ideal point, the voting equilibrium is unique.
In a bottom-up budget process the sequence of votes is taken in each dimension at a time.
For instance, if there are two dimensions the vote is taken first on one dimension and then on the
other. With Euclidean preferences in two dimensions, the voting equilibrium is invariant under
permutations of the sequence of dimensions. One gets the same bottom-up equilibrium if the vote
on dimension 1 is first, or if the vote on dimension 2 is first. This also holds true for higher
dimensions, when m ≥ 2. The structurally induced equilibrium is constructed from the voting
equilibrium in each dimension of the process. Let xbu denote the equilibrium induced by a
bottom-up budget process.
In a top-down budget process, the sequence of votes starts with a vote on the total budget.
Then votes are taken on the distribution of total spending over m-1 spending categories. For
instance, if there are two dimensions, the vote is taken first on the total budget and then on a
dimension orthogonal to that one, the dimension corresponding to the difference in the two
spending categories.2Again, the voting equilibrium is invariant under permutations of the
sequence of orthogonal dimensions. The structurally induced equilibrium is constructed from the
the voting equilibrium in each dimension of the voting taken. Let xtd denote the equilibrium
induced by a top-down budget process.
In general, xtd does not equal xbu. A sufficient condition for xtd and xbu to be equal is that
there exist a Condorcet equilibrium xC over the entire space of budgets, in which case xtd and xbu
equal xC. As already pointed out, this condition is unlikely to be satisfied in practice. One way to
see this in two dimensions (the same insight holds for higher dimensions) is to note that a
Condorcet equilibrium must have majority support in every dimension. Consider the case of
bottom-up voting first. We seek possible configurations under which a median voter is the same
in both dimensionshence this median voter’s ideal point is the Condorcet equilibrium. The
simplest such configuration is if all the voters’ ideal points are arrayed on a straight line (see
Figure 1). The first vote is determined by the median of the ideal points projected onto the first
budget dimension (line a) and the second vote by the median of the ideal points projected onto
the second dimension (line b). Line a and line b meet at the bottom-up equilibrium xbu which is
equal to the ideal point x*(2) and therefore equal to the desired Condorcet equilibrium xC.
Next consider the case of top-down voting. The first vote is determined by the median of
the preferred total budgets. This decision is graphically represented by the median -45° line
through the ideal points (line c). The second decision, the vote on the first category, is graphically
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 This vote could also be taken over a non-orthogonal dimension, such as dimension 1 or dimension 2,
without changing the resulting voting equilibrium.
5represented by the median 45° line through the ideal points (line d). Line c and line d also meet at
x*(2). Thus, xtd equals xC as well.
When this sufficient condition is not satisfied, , bottom-up and top-down voting may lead
to different outcomes. See figures 2 and 3, which illustrate this for the case of n = 5, m = 2.
Second
budget
category
First budget category
x*(2) = xbu = xtd  = xC
x*(1)
x*(3)
a
b
dc
Figure 1: Condorcet equilibrium
2.2 Specific models
For all experiments studied here, the number of voters, n, equals 5. The number of
spending categories, m, equals either 2 or 4. To specify the voters' utility functions, we have two
designsone design is such that the voting equilibrium of a top-down budget process leads to a
larger budget than the voting equilibrium of a bottom-up budget process, and vice versa in the
other design.
We discuss first the simpler case m = 2. To specify the voters' utility functions, we have
two designs, design I and design II. They are presented in Table 1. Notice that the two designs
differ by voter 4’s ideal point only. Voters 1, 2, 3, and 5 have the same ideal points in both
designs. The general intention behind these two designs is to make the difference between the
equilibrium induced by a bottom-up process, xtd , and the equilibrium induced by a top-down
process, xbu, large and in different directions. As can be seen in Table 2, in design I, the total
budget corresponding to xbu is smaller than the total budget corresponding to xtd , while the
opposite is true in design II.
6For design I, the median of the dimension 1 components of the ideal points is 8. The
median of the dimension 2 components of ideal points is 13. Putting the components from the
two dimensions together, we get (8, 13). The solution induced by the bottom-up process is the
vector (8, 13). This is xbu. The total spending under this budget is 21.
The solution induced by the top-down process is the vector (10, 13). This is xtd. The total
spending under this budget is 23. To find the top-down solution, start with two orthogonal
dimensions, corresponding to the x1+x2 dimension and the x1-x2 dimension. In the x1+x2
dimension, the sum of ideal points components of the five players is 19, 16, 24, 23, and 25,
respectively. The median of these components is 23. In the x1-x2 dimension, the  difference of
ideal points components of the five players is -7, -2, -8, -1, -3, respectively. The median of these
components is -3. Solving the pair of equations x1+x2 = 23 and x1-x2= -3 yields x1 = 10, x2 = 13.
 The ideal points and the voting equilibria of design I are shown in Figure 2. Graphically,
the bottom-up equilibrium xbu = (8,13) is determined by the intersection of the vertical median
line through the ideal points a and the horizontal median line b. The top-down equilibrium xtd =
(10,13) is determined by the intersection of the -45° median line c and the 45° median line d.
Notice that xtd is different from xbu. Bottom-up voting leads to a smaller budget, 21, than does
top-down voting, 23.
 For design II, the solution xbu induced by the bottom-up process is the vector (8, 13). The
total spending under this budget is 21. This is the same as in design I. However, for the top down
process, the solution xtd is the vector (8, 11). The total spending under this budget is 19. Notice
that xtd is different from xbu, but in contrast to design I, top-down voting leads to a smaller
budget, 19, than does bottom-down voting, 21 (see Figure 3). This is because the median voter,
here voter 4, goes from wanting to spend 23 units in design I to 18 units in design II.
We consider now the case m = 4. The basic principle in getting from two dimensions to
four dimensions is projection: (x1, x2) maps into (x1, x2, x1, x2). The ideal points of each player are
presented in Table 1. The medians of the ideal points in each dimension are preserved under
projection.
For design III, which is the projection of design I, the medians in dimensions 1 and 3 are
8; in dimensions 2 and 4, 13. Putting the components from the four dimensions together, we get
xbu , the vector (8, 13, 8, 13). The total spending under this budget is 42.
The solution xtd induced by the top-down process is the vector (10, 13, 10, 13); this again
follows by projection. The total spending under this budget is 46. Notice that xtd is different from
xbu, and in particular that xtd spends more than xbu, 46 versus 42.
For design IV, which is the projection of design II, the medians in dimensions 1 and 3 of
the ideal points are 8; in dimensions 2 and 4, 13. Putting the components from the four
dimensions together, we get (8, 13, 8, 13) as the bottom-up vector xbu . Total spending under this
budget is 42.
7The solution xtd induced by the top-down process is the (8, 11, 8, 11). The total spending
under this budget is 38. Notice that xtd also differs from xbu. In contrast to design III, top-down
voting leads to a smaller budget, 38, than the budget of size 42 that bottom-up voting adopts.
Table 1: Individual ideal points and utility function, x*(i) and ui(x)
m = 2 m = 4
Design I Design II Design III Design IV
Voter i x1*(i) x2*(i) x1*(i) x2*(i) x1*(i) x2*(i) x3*(i) x4*(i) x1*(i) x2*(i) x3*(i) x4*(i)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
11
11
13
9
16
12
14
6
7
8
9
11
13
9
16
9
14
6
7
8
11
11
13
9
16
12
14
6
7
8
11
11
13
9
16
12
14
6
7
8
9
11
13
9
16
9
14
6
7
8
9
11
13
9
16
9
14
Utility
Function
Of voter i
ui(x)
15 2
1
2
− −
=
∑ [ ( )]*x x ij j
j
30 2
1
4
− −
=
∑ [ ( )]*x x ij j
j
Table 2: Voting equilibria
m = 2 m = 4
Design I Design II Design III Design IV
Process x1 x2 x1 x2 x1 x2 x3 x4 x1 x2 x3 x4
Bottom-up 8 13 8 13 8 13 8 13 8 13 8 13
Σ 21 21 42 42
Top-down 10 13 8 11 10 13 10 13 8 11 8 11
Σ 23 19 46 38
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Second
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First budget category
Figure 2: Voting equilibria (design I)
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Figure 3: Voting equilibria (design II)
93. Experimental design
The instructions for the experiment are based on those of the classic voting experiment
conducted by Plott and Krehbiel (1979). Copies of the instructions (in German) are available
from the authors upon request.
In the experiment, subjects are told that each of them is member of a group of 5 subjects.
In designs I and II, the group’s task is to decide on how many integer-valued tokens to spend on
two activities, called A and B. In the instructions for a bottom-up budget process, subjects are
told that they first have to decide on the number of tokens to be spent on activity A. Their
decision on this number is final. They then have to decide on the number of tokens to be spent on
activity B, at which point they have completed their task. In the instructions for a top-down
budget process, subjects are told that they first have to decide on the number of tokens to be spent
on activities A and B together. Their decision on this number is final. They then have to decide on
the number of tokens to be spent on activity A, at which point they have completed their task.
In designs III and IV, the group’s task is to decide on how many tokens to spend on four
activities, called A, B, C, and D. In the instructions for a bottom-up budget process, subjects are
told that they first have to decide on the number of tokens to be spent for activity A. Their
decision on this number is final. They then repeat this process for activities B, C, and D in that
order, at which point they have completed their task. In the instructions for a top-down budget
process, subjects are told that they first have to decide on the number of tokens to be spent on
activities A, B, C, and D together. Their decision on this number is final. They then have to
decide on the number of tokens to be spent on activities, A, B, and C in that order, at which point
they have completed their task.
At each step, the decision task is to decide on a number of tokens to be spent on some
category or combination of categories. The decision process starts with a proposal on the floor
which equals zero. At any point in time, each subject has the right to propose an amendment. If an
amendment is proposed, then the group has to vote on it. If the proposed amendment is accepted,
then it becomes the new proposal on the floor. If the proposed amendment is rejected, it has no
effect; the proposal on the floor remains unchanged. In that case, each subject is free to propose
another amendments, but only one amendment, at a time. At any point of time, a subject may also
propose to end the process. If this proposal is accepted, then the proposal on the floor is
considered accepted. If the proposal to end deliberations is rejected, then new amendments may
be proposed or new proposals for ending the process may be made.
All votes are based on simple majority rule. This implies that if three or more members of
the group vote in favor of the proposal, then it wins. Otherwise the proposal is rejected.
In the beginning of the experiment, each subject is informed about his personal payoff (or
utility) function. The instructions give each subject the exact formula for the payoff function,
which is also explained to him. In the case of two spending categories (design I and design II), the
subject is given a table which shows his or her payoff for each combination of numbers in the two
spending categories. In all four designs, each subject can, in the final dimension of voting, call up
10
on his or her computer screen to see individual payoff for  the proposal on the table and the
proposed amendment.
Besides designs I through IV, which differ with respect to the number of spending
categories and the ideal points, we distinguish between two informational treatments. In the
complete information treatment each subject knows not only his own ideal point, but also the
ideal points of the four other players in his group. In the incomplete information treatment, each
player is only informed about his own ideal point.
The experiments were organized at the University of Karlsruhe. Subjects were students
from various disciplines. The experiments were computerized. Each subject was seated at a
computer terminal which was isolated from other subjects’ terminals by wooden screens. The
subjects received written instructions which were also read aloud by a research assistant. Before
an experiment started, each subject had to answer at his computer terminal a short questionnaire
(10 questions) concerning the instructions. Only after all subjects had given the right answers to
all questions did decision-making begin. No communication other than through the recognition of
proposals and the announcement of the outcomes of votes was permitted.
We organized sessions with 15 or more subjects. Thus, no subject could identify with
which of the other participants he or she was grouped. Each subject participated in exactly one
experiment; thus, each group of 5 subjects yielded an independent observation. For each design
(4), each budget process (2), and each information condition (2), we obtained 8 independent
observations, for a total of  128 experiments. Table 3 gives an overview of the experimental
design. In obtaining these 128 independent observations, we also acquired data on 640 subjects, 5
each per experiment.
Table 3: Treatment design
Number of groups (subjects)
M = 2 m = 4
Design I Design II Design III Design IV
Complete
information
Bottom-up
Top-down
8 (40)
8 (40)
8 (40)
8 (40)
8 (40)
8 (40)
8 (40)
8 (40)
Incomplete
information
Bottom-up
Top-down
8 (40)
8 (40)
8 (40)
8 (40)
8 (40)
8 (40)
8 (40)
8 (40)
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4. Experimental results
This section considers aggregate data from the experiment; the next section, individual
data. Start with the sizes of the overall budgets we observe in these 128 experiments. Tables 4
(for the 2-dimensional treatment) and 5 (for the four-dimensional treatment) give an overview of
observed group voting outcomes in all treatments. In situations where top-down voting equilibria
spend more than bottom-up voting equilibria (designs I and III), we observe this very clearly in
the data. The same holds true in situations where top-down voting equilibria spend less than
bottom-up voting equilibria (designs II and IV). With complete information, the differences
between bottom-up and top-down total budgets are significant at the 10% level in design I, and at
the 5 percent level in designs II, III and IV (Mann-Whitney U-test). With incomplete information,
the corresponding differences are significant at the 10 percent level in design II, and at the 5
percent level in designs III and IV. In design I the difference is not statistically significant at the
10 percent level; but it does go in the right direction.3
Result 1. Sequence matters. The outcomes observed under bottom-up and top-down voting differ
from each other significantly.
We next show that voting equilibrium is a good predictor. To see this visually, first pool
the data from designs I and II, and call the pooled data the 2-dimensional treatment. Figure 4
shows the scatter diagram of 2-dimensional treatment data relative to the predicted value. Notice
how tight the scatter is around the voting equilibrium prediction; the average Euclidean distance
of an observation from the predicted value is 1.5, a small number relative to a predicted total sum
of between 19 and 23. A similar picture emerges for the 4-dimensional treatment, where the
average Euclidean distance of an observation from the predicted value is 2.6, again a small
number relative to a predicted total sum of between 38 and 46. Pooling over all 128 observations,
the average Euclidean distance of the observed budgets from voting equilibrium is 2.1.
Result 2. Voting equilibrium is a good predictor of budget outcome. The average distance of
observed outcomes from predicted equilibrium is 2.1, a small number.
                                                
3
 A single large outlier is responsible for this lack of statistical significance.
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Table 4: Average budgets in the two-dimensional treatments
Design I Design II
Information Bottom-up Top-down Bottom-up Top-down
Complete
Incomplete
21.4
22.6
22.5
22.6
21.4
21.5
19.0
20.1
Voting equilibrium 21 23 21 19
Table 5: Average budgets in the four-dimensional treatments
Design III Design IV
Information Bottom-up Top-down Bottom-up Top-down
Complete
Incomplete
42.1
43.4
46.4
46.6
43.0
43.8
38.0
38.6
Voting equilibrium 42 46 42 38
Next, introduce another measure of closeness of an observed budget to a predicted
equilibrium: an observation is close to predicted equilibrium if it does not deviate from it by more
than one unit in any spending category. Over all treatments, 53.9% are close (10 out of 128
outcomes, or 7.8%, hit the predicted equilibrium exactly).
Table 6 reports the percentages of observations close to the voting equilibrium prediction
for all information-dimensionality treatments. First, we see that with complete information, a
higher percentage of outcomes is equal or close to the voting equilibrium than under incomplete
information. This is true for each dimensional treatment separately, as well as on average, the
respective averages being 62.5% versus 45.3%. Second, we see that with lower dimensionality, a
higher percentage of outcomes is equal or close to the voting equilibrium than with higher
dimensionality. This is true for each information treatment separately, as well as on average, the
respective averages being 67.2% versus 40.6%.
Result 3. Institutions matter: more than half (53.9%) of all observed budgets are close to the
predicted voting equilibrium.
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Figure 4: Distribution of outcomes around equilibrium
It is mathematically easier to realize an outcome which is equal or close to the voting
equilibrium in two dimensions than in four dimensions. To address this concern, we apply to the
data in Table 6 Selten’s (1991) measure of predictive success, which adjusts for dimensionality in
the following way. Define the hit rate as the frequency of outcomes close to the voting
equilibrium; define the area rate as the area of all points near the voting equilibrium, relative to
the set of reasonable outcomes—outcomes any reasonable theory might allow for. Selten’s
measure then is the difference between the hit rate and the area rate. In particular, the area rate in
two dimensions is greater than the area rate in four dimensions.
To see this, consider the set of natural numbers bounded in each direction by the
minimum and the maximum values of subjects’ ideal points. Call this the set of reasonable
outcomes—it contains the set of Pareto optima, and also includes outcomes which are nearly
Pareto optima. In designs I and II (dimension 2), the set of reasonable outcomes is the rectangle
defined by the corners (6,9), (6,16), (11,9), (11,16), and contains 48 points. The area close to the
voting equilibrium covers 9 points, so the area rate is 9/48 or 19 percent.
In designs III and IV (dimension 4), the set of reasonable outcomes is the polyhedron
defined by the points (6,9,6,9), (6,16,6,16), (11,16,11,16), and (11,9,11,9), and contains 2304
points. The area equal or close to the voting equilibrium covers 81 points, so the area rate is
81/2304 or 3%. This verifies mathematically that it is harder to get close to a voting equilibrium
in four dimensions where the area rate is 3%, than in two dimensions, where the area rate is 19%.
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Table 6: Percentage of budgets close to the voting equilibrium budget
Information Two-dimensional Four-dimensional Average
Complete 78.1 46.9 62.5
Incomplete 56.3 34.4 45.3
Average 67.2 40.6 53.8
Given these area rates, we can compute the measures of predictive success for the
dimensionality treatment; Table 7 shows the results. In two dimensions, the hit rate is 67.2% and
the area rate is 19%, yielding a predictive success of 48.2%. In four dimensions, the hit rate is
40.6% and the area rate is 3%, yielding a predictive success of 37.6%. Although predictive
success is still greater in two dimensions than in four, the difference is much reduced. To put
these levels of predictive success in context, note that the predictive success of Nash equilibrium
theory is often less than 5% (Keser and Gardner, 1999).
Result 4. The predictive success of voting equilibrium theory is 43%. Predictive success increases
with complete information, and with fewer spending categories.
Table 7: Predictive Success of Voting Equilibria
Information Two-dimensional Four-dimensional Average
Complete 59.1 43.9 51.5
Incomplete 37.3 31.4 34.4
Average 48.2 37.6 43.0
Table 8 shows the average number of moves—a proposal followed by a vote—needed to
reach a budget decision in the information-dimensionality treatments. To reach a budget decision
takes about 30 percent more moves with incomplete information, as opposed to complete
information. To reach a budget decision in four dimensions takes about twice as many moves as
in two dimensions. Since the 4-dimensional case requires twice as many final decisions made as
the 2-dimensional case, we conclude that, relative to the number of spending categories the same
effort is needed to reach a budget decision in both cases.
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Result 5. The number of moves needed to reach a budget decision is greater with incomplete
information than with complete information. The number of moves needed to reach a budget
decision increases proportionally with the number of spending categories.
Table 8: Average number of moves to reach the budget decision
Information Two-dimensional Four-dimensional
Complete
Incomplete
11.0
14.5
22.6
28.8
5.  Individual behavior
Now turn to data on individual behavior. We consider first the effect of the information
treatment on individual proposals. In two dimensions with incomplete information, subjects
propose their ideal points 55.9% of the time; with complete information, 42.5%. This difference
is significant at the 1 percent level (χ2 - test). In four dimensions with incomplete information,
subjects propose their ideal points 47.8% of the time; with complete information,  40.8%. This
difference is significant at the 5 percent level (χ2 - test).
Result 6. With incomplete information, subjects propose their individual ideal points significantly
more often than with complete information.
This makes sense. If subjects’ information is incomplete, then proposing one’s ideal point has
considerable signaling value. Subjects could be exploiting this signaling potential.
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Table 9: Direction of Proposals, with reference to an individual’s optimal value (OV) .4
Percent of proposals
Dimensions Information Towards
equilibrium
Equal to OV Away from
equilibrium
Two Complete 57.3 37.6 5.1
Two Incomplete 30.8 53.0 16.2
Four Complete 49.9 41.9 8.2
Four Incomplete 35.3 46.4 18.3
Table 9 gives the relative frequencies with which proposals made by individuals moved
towards equilibrium, stayed at an individuals’ optimal value (OV), or moved away from
equilibrium. With complete information, the most frequently made proposals moved towards
equilibrium; with incomplete information, the most frequently made proposals stayed at an
individual’s optimal value. Across all treatments, the least frequently made proposals moved
away from equilibrium. Table 9 clearly reveals that across all treatments, the majority of
proposals, if they deviate from a subject's respective optimal value, move towards voting
equilibrium. This is significant at the 5 percent level (sign-test).
Result 7. Subjects, when not proposing their optimal value, deviate from it in the direction of the
voting equilibrium. This is true both under complete and incomplete information.
This is an important indicator of the quality of proposals and of the rationality of the subjects.
Subjects’ proposals drive an equilibrium-seeking process.
Once an amendment to a proposal has been made, subjects have to vote on it. Table 10
considers for each individual vote whether the amendment, if adopted, would increase, leave
unchanged, or decrease the subject's status quo utility, and records the relative frequency of votes
for acceptance in each case. We see that in all information-dimensionality treatments, a majority
of individuals vote to support utility-increasing amendments, while a minority of individuals vote
to support utility-decreasing amendments. This tendency to accept utility-increasing amendments
and to reject utility-decreasing amendments is significant at the 1 percent level (binomial-test)
                                                
4
 By value we mean the amount of either the total budget or the respective spending category, depending on
the decision situation. We exclude from consideration all subjects whose OV coincides with equilibrium.
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Result 8. Subjects’ voting behavior with respect to amendments on the floor is sequentially
rational. They accept amendments if they increase their status quo utility, and reject amendments
if they decrease their status quo utility.
This result provides more support for subjects’ rationality, as evidenced through their voting
behavior.
Table 11 shows for all information-dimensionality treatments, the percentage of proposals
that have the values of voting equilibrium, at the amendment stage, as accepted proposals, and as
final decisions. In each treatment we observe an increase in the frequency of voting equilibrium
values, from the amendment stage to final decision. Furthermore, across all dimension-
information treatments, the frequency of voting equilibrium is higher with complete information
than with incomplete information, and higher in 2 dimensions than in four dimensions. This
suggests that complexity is again the enemy of voting equilibrium, since both incomplete
information and more spending categories make the decision task more complex.
Result 9. The percentage of voting equilibrium values increases from the amendment stage to the
final decision stage. Complexity in the form of more spending categories or incomplete
information reduces this percentage.
To conclude, our results support the concept of voting equilibrium also on the level of
individual behavior, as subjects exhibit considerable rationality in their proposals and votes.
Table 10: Percentage of individual votes supporting proposals to increase,
leave unchanged, or decrease utility
Relative frequency of accepted votes
if the effect of the amendment relative to the status quo is
Dimensions Information Increase No change Decrease
Two Complete 69.1 58.2 13.6
Two Incomplete 69.0 48.6 7.6
Four Complete 56.2 43.5 27.9
Four Incomplete 63.9 46.8 24.6
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Table 11: Percentage of proposals that have the values of voting equilibrium
Percentage of voting equilibrium values in
Dimensions Information Amendments Accepted
proposals
Final decisions
Two Complete 24.3 35.1 50.0
Two Incomplete 15.9 25.2 37.5
Four Complete 20.7 28.6 36.7
Four Incomplete 16.3 21.5 34.4
6. Conclusion
This paper has studied budget processesthe system of rules governing decision-making,
leading to a budgetboth theoretically and experimentally. On the theoretical side, we have
shown that a top-down budget process does not necessarily lead to a smaller overall budget than a
bottom-up budget process does. We then conducted a series of 128 experiments to study
budgeting processes using subjects in a behavior laboratory. The evidence from those
experiments supported the theory of voting equilibrium, both at the aggregate level and at the
individual subject level. The subjects in these experiments exhibited behavior of a high degree of
sophistication, both in the proposals they made and in the votes they cast. Neither incomplete
information nor high dimensionality of the task prevented them from coming close to the
predicted voting equilibrium.
These results have three important policy implications. First and foremost, institutions
matter. The kind of budget one gets from a budget process is driven by the voting equilibrium of
that process, and the voting equilibrium depends on the institution being used. If one uses an
inefficient or irrational institution, one can expect inefficient or irrational outcomes.
Second, sequence matters. Policy makers should not presume that a top-down budget
process always leads to less spending. As we have seen, that presumption is tantamount to
presuming unsophisticated behavior on the part of voters in budget processes. On the contrary, we
observe highly sophisticated voting behavior in our sample of 640 subjects. Indeed, sophisticated
voters with big-spender preferences will not be deterred by a top-down process from arriving at a
big-spending budget.
Finally, complexity is costly. If we measure decision-making costs in terms of the number
of votes required to reach closure, those costs go up with more spending categories and with less
incomplete information. To the extent that decision-making costs are important, agenda setters in
a budget process, such as finance ministers, are well-advised to keep the overall decision low-
dimensional, even if this means relying on local autonomy for more detailed budget allocations.
While incomplete information also increases decision-making costs, it does not appear to
19
significantly reduce the predictive success of voting equilibrium theory. This increases the real-
world applicability of our results, since complete information, even in a cabinet or legislature of
long standing, is rare.
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